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ing to the property of his victim are inapplicable.
I lowever the absence of
a statute expressly applicable23 does not seem to be sufficient reason for
4
allowing the slayer to take the entire estate in view of the contrary equities.2
It appears that the solution to the problem lies in legislation.25 But the
legislature in North Dakota has not, as yet, felt the need for such pronouncements and it is still a question whether adequate language can be devised to
meet the peculiar sets of facts likely to arise. 2' One of the relevant problems
presented to the legislature in this situation would he the state of the record
title and its effect on the abstracting profession.'
The North Dakota courts
have not been faced with the problem, and are free to follow any of the four
lines of authorities without being bound by statute or precedent.
The better view appears to be the tenancy-in-common theory. This rule
presents not only the most equitable, but also the most legally jutiflable result.
Under such a result the problem of forfeiture is avoided and the strong public
policy against the assassin is well satisfied.28
PAUL

REAL PROPERTY - OIL

PFEILSTICKEIR.

- EFFECT OF TAX SALE ON PREVIOUSLY
In an action to quiet title to minerals, it appeared that the owner of certain lands in 1924 conveyed the surface to Odental, reserving all mineral rights; this deed was recorded. In 1932 the county
took title for nonpayment of taxes, and in the same year conveyed the premises
to McLain by tax deed, reciting the government description. McLain then conveyed to the defendant by warranty deed. In 1936 Odenthal's surface grantor
quitclaimed the reserved mineral rights to Odenthal, who in 1954 conveyed
these rights to plaintiffs by deed which was recorded one month prior to commencement of this suit. In affirming the trial court's decree for plaintiffs the
court held that where a tax deed is taken after a severance of mineral rights,
purporting to convey the government description without specifically including
the mineral interests, the county acquires tax title to the surface only. Bilby v.
Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882 (N. D. 1956).
Statutes in North Dakota, and most other jurisdictions, expressly provide
for severance of mineral rights, and their separate taxation., However, courts
disagree as to what interests are derived from purchase of tax deed when
mineral interests have been severed. This variation is due to procedural dif-

SEVERED MINERAL

AND

GAS

INTERESTS. -

22. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951); Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 295,
54 N.W.2d 385 (1952); But some courts rely unon such a statnte as an. indication of
public policy. See, Bradley v. Fox, 129 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ill. 1955).
23. It appears that North Dakota has no express statute anplicable to joint tenants in
this problem. However, see N. D. Rev. Code § 56-0423 (1943) as applicable to wills
and succession.
24. See Atkinson, Wills 1 37 (2d ed. 1953); 3 Bogart, Trusts and Trustees 1 478
(2d ed. 1946); 3 Scott, Trusts 1 493.2 (1939).
25. For statutes covering the situation see Ky. Rev. Stat. § 381.280 (1955); Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 20, 1 3446 (Purdon's Snpp. 1950): S. D. Code § 58.0505 (1939); See Wade,
Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing AnotherA Statutory Solution, 49 Harv. L.
Rev. 715 (1935).
26. Wade, supra note 25.
27. A pertinent problem is whether the ahstractor must look beyond the fact of death
in a joint tenancy. situation. For one solution see Wade. vunro note 25 at 749.
28. Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process, 43 (1921)
("The social interest served
by refusing to permit the criminal to profit by his crime is greater than that served by
the presevation and enforcement of legal rights of ownership.")
W.

1. E.g., 18 Minn. Stat. Ann. i 272.04 (1945);
Va. Code Ann. § 715 (1949).

N. D. Rev. Code § 57-0224 (1943);
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RECENT CASES

ferences followed in assessment and taxation of such interests and their subsequent construction by the courts. The courts usually hold that when no
specific assessment has been made of the mineral interests the assessment will
nevertheless be held to apply only to the surface, because once the statutes
authorize assessment of severed mineral interests the courts must regard tile
assessment as having been made.: Even where statutes do not so provide, it
is generally held that the severed mineral interests are independently taxable
as real estate.3 Furthermore the surface and the mineral rights are held by
separate and distinct titles in severalty,' and each is a freehold estate of inheritance separate and independent of the other." They are assessed separately
and lost separately by tax sale, with no effect on the other estate." Counties
do not warrant the tax title conveyed, and therefore, the purchaser cannot
reasonably assume that the government description conveys the entire fee
simple. It follows that forfeiture of the surface interest for non-paymtent of
taxes will have no effect on the title of the mineral owner. 7
A few courts hold that a tax sale of the surface owner's interest will carry
the severed mineral rights with it., Furthermore, the mineral estate, not being charged on the tax rolls, passes with a tax deed to the surface." To avoid
this result the description of the interests assessed and sold must informn not
only the owner but all other persons of reservations from the interests sold.'
These courts apparently reason that a valid assessment is essential to a valid
sreparation of the surface from the minerals. Such courts hold that a sale of
land for taxes will carry both surface and minerals unless they are separately
assessed." A similar result would be reached in Oklahoma, where by statute
mineral estates are not severable and all interests are assessed to the owner.' 2
Admitting that a contrary result should be reached where mineral interests
are not severable from the surfacey: it is submitted that the result in the
2. Dingess v. lumtington Development and Gas Co., 271 Fed. 864 (1921)
(There
was no evidence as to whether the mineral rights were or w-re ,not s,-parately valued and
listed); Campbell v. Barry, 152 Minn. 13, 187 N.W. 967 (1922); Washburn v. Gregory,
.125 Minn., 491, 147 N.W. 706, 708 (1914)
(dictum); Kernkamp v. Wellville Fire Brick
Co., 237 Mo.App. 407, 170 S.W.2d 692 (1943).
3. 2 Cooley, Taxation § 566 (4th ed. 1924).
4. Shell Oil Co. v. Moore, 382 Ill. 556, 48 N.E.2d 400, 402 (1943)
(dictum).
5. Ibid.
6. Skelly Oil Co. v. Johnson, 209 Ark. 1107, 194 S.W.2d 425 (1916).
7. See Sims v. Vosberg, 43 N. M. 255, 91 P.2d 434 (1939); Mitchell v. Espinosa,
125 Colo. 267, 243 P.2d 412 (1952); Johnson v. McLaughlin. 125 Colo. 298, 242 P.2d
812 (1952); Northern Pacific Ry. v. Advance Realty Co. 78 N.W.2d 705 (N.. D. 1956);
2 Cooley. Taxation 1 566 (4th ed. 1924).
8. Peterson v. Hall, 57 W. Va. 535, 50 S.E. 603 (1905).
.9. Wellman v. Hoge, 66 W. Va. 234, 66 S.E. 357 (1909)
(The owner 'onveyed
property with a reservation of the gas and oil. The tract was thereafter assessed to the
grantee without reservation. There was no separate assessment of th,. gas and .iil. It
was held that the gas and oil passed with the surface to purchaser at subsequent tax sale.)
10. See American Portland Cement Co. v. Certain Lands, 179 Ark. 553, 17 S.W.2d
281 (1929); Brinkley v. Halliburton, 129 Ark. 234, 196 S.W. 118 (1917).
11. Huffman v. Henderson Co., 184 Ark. 278. 42 S.W.2d 221 (1921)
(There
as no
reference made to the minerals in the ass,-ssment as required by statute.); McCracken v.
Hlummel, 43 Cal.2d 302, 110 P.2d 700 (1941)
(Reservation of oil and gas rights.
statute provided for senarat- assessment, but it was never done); Polk County v. Basham.
234 Iowa 225, 12 N.W.2d 157 (1943)
(Since record showed no aOportionment of tax and
no separate assessment of mineral rights all outstanding claims thereto were cut off by
tax deed.)
12. Okla. Ann. Stat. H1 29, 30 (provide that oil and gas while lying in the strata of
earth from which they are produced must be taxed as real property to the owner of the
land if the land is taxable - the various interests are not separable for the purpose of
taxation); See State v. Shamblin, 159 Okla. 126, 90 P.2d 1053 (1939); State v. Krichner,
185 Okla. 129, 90 P.2d 1055 (1939).
13. Ibid.
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instant case is more reasonable than allowing the tax purchaser to take the
severed mineral interest. The severed interests support a relationship analagous to that between owners of adjoining tracts of land. No one would contend
that one owner's forfeiture of realty for taxes could affect the rights of his
neighbor in the adjoining tract.
ARMOND C.
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Employer sued a defendant employee to compel a
conveyance to the employer of mineral interests acquired by the employee for
his own use. Plaintiff was engaged in purchasing and developing oil and gas
leases, mineral interests and royalties in land, and producing minerals therefrom. Defendant was production manager for the plaintiff in the Williston Basin
where the mineral acres in dispute were located. Plaintiff corporation had a
rule stating that all mineral interests purchased by employees would be considered to be held in trust for the corporation. Defendant employee did not
sign any agreement to this effect or agree to it orally, but did know of the rule.
Evidence proved that defendant did not use confidential information in securing the lease. The United States Court of Appeals held that the trial court was
correct in finding that defendant was not a fiduciary of plaintiff with respect
to the acquisition of mineral interests for his own benefit. Amerada Petroleum
Corporation v. Burline, 231 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1956).
A constructive trust is defined as a trust raised by operation of law, imposed
by a court of equity upon a person in a fiduciary or confidential relationship,
in order to prevent him from holding an advantage which he gained by
reason of breach of such relationship.' A confidential relationship is of major
2
A fiduciary or confidential
importance in establishing a constructive trust.
relationship is not restricted to such confined relations as trustee and benefici3
ary, partners, attorney and client, principal and agent, but applies to all
persons who occupy a position out of which the duty of good faith ought, in
4
equity and good conscience, to arise. Therefore the rule is formed that an
employee in a confidential relationship is barred from using, for his own bene5
fit, secret information belonging to his employer. The rule is deceptively
ILOYEES AND OFFICaRS. -

1. N. D. Rev. Code, J 59-0108 (1943) (Constructive trust. Everyone who voluntarily assumes a relation of personal confidence with another is deemed to be a trustee
within the meaning of this chapter, not only as to the person who reposes confidence, but
as to all persons of whose affairs he thus acquires information which was given to such
person in the like confidence or over whose affairs he, by such confidence obtains, any
control); Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill.2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699, 705 (1955) (dictum); Compton
v. Compton, 414 I1. 149, 111 N.E.2d 109, 113 (1953) (dictum).
2. McDonald v. Miller, 71 N. D. 474, 16 N.W.2d 270 (1944); Young v. Bradley,
142 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1944) (dictum); See Nelson Development Co. v. Ohio Oil
Co., 45 F.Supp. 933 (E. D. Ill.1942); City of Rochelle v. Stocking, 336 Il1. App. 6,
82 N.E.2d 693 (1948) (Mere failure to perform an agreement or to carry out a promise
cannot in itself give rise to a constructive trust).
3. Cranwell v. Ogelsky, 229 Mass. 148, 12 N.E.2d 81 (1937). See Coombs v.
Minor, 60 Cal. App.2d 645, 141 P.2d 491, 495 (1943) (dictum); Fipps v. Stidham, 174
Old. 322, 50 P.2d 680, 683 (1935) .(dictum) ("Confidential" and "'fiduciary" relations
held to be synonymous).
4. Barker v. Barker, 75 N. D. 253, 27 N.W.2d 576 (1947); Metzger v. Metzger, 338
Pa. 564, 14 A.2d 285 (1940); Risk v. Risher, 197 Miss 155, 19 So.2d 484, 486 (1944)
(dictum).

5. Witmer, v. Arkansas Dairies, 202 Ark. 470, 151 S.W.2d 971 (1941); Reiss v.
Srnford, 47 Cal. App.2d 244, 117 P.2d 694 (1941); Empire Steam Laundry v. Lazier,
165 Cal. 95, 130 Pac. 1180 (1913) (by statute); Morrison v. Woodbury, 105 Kan. 617,
185 Pac. 735 (1919); Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 71, 67 N.E.2d 667 (1946); Jewel
Tea Co. v. Grissom, 66 S. D. 146, 279 N.W. 544, 545 (1938) (dictum).

